Les informations

Des singes porteurs de GPS et de compteurs Geiger pour mesurer la radioactivité
http://radioprotection.eklablog.com/special-japon-des-singes-porteurs-de-gps-et-de-compteurs-geiger-pour-m-a26986151

Bonjour
A se demander si on doit en rire ou en pleurer...
Concernant les photos vous en trouverez dans la prochaine synthèse qui est actuellement en relecture.
KLOUG

Les champions des robots ne sont pas foutu d'en envoyer sur zone?
Mais que fais la peau lice!...

merci à Fils de Poulain
http://blogs.sacbee.com/photos/2011/09/japan-marks-6-months-since-ear.html
CHAPEAU LES MECS!

Hi, sur le site du Mainichi :

'Absolutely no progress being made' at Fukushima nuke plant, undercover reporter says

Conditions at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant are far worse than its operator or the government has admitted, according to freelance journalist Tomohiko Suzuki, who spent more than a month working undercover at the power station.

"Absolutely no progress is being made" towards the final resolution of the crisis, Suzuki told reporters at a Foreign Correspondents' Club of Japan news conference on Dec. 15. Suzuki, 55, worked for a Toshiba Corp. subsidiary as a general laborer there from July 13 to Aug. 22, documenting sloppy repair work, companies including plant operator Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO) playing fast and loose with their workers' radiation doses, and a marked concern for appearances over the safety of employees or the public.

For example, the no-entry zones around the plant -- the 20-kilometer radius exclusion zone and the extension covering most of the village of Iitate and other municipalities -- have more to do with convenience that actual safety, Suzuki says.

"(Nuclear) technology experts I've spoken to say that there are people living in areas where no one should be. It's almost as though they're living inside a nuclear plant," says Suzuki. Based on this and his own radiation readings, he believes the 80-kilometer-radius evacuation advisory issued by the United States government after the meltdowns was "about right," adding that the government probably decided on the current no-go zones to avoid the immense task of evacuating larger cities like Iwaki and Fukushima.

The situation at the plant itself is no better, where he says much of the work is simply "for show," fraught with corporate jealousies and secretiveness and "completely different" from the "all-Japan" cooperative effort being presented by the government.

"Reactor makers Toshiba and Hitachi (brought in to help resolve the crisis) each have their own technology, and they don't talk to each other. Toshiba doesn't tell Hitachi what it's doing, and Hitachi doesn't tell Toshiba what it's doing."

Meanwhile, despite there being no concrete data on the state of the reactor cores, claims by the government and TEPCO that the disaster is under control and that the reactors are on-schedule for a cold shutdown by the year's end have promoted a breakneck work schedule, leading to shoddy repairs and habitual disregard for worker safety, he said.

"Working at Fukushima is equivalent to being given an order to die," Suzuki quoted one nuclear-related company source as saying. He says plant workers regularly manipulate their radiation readings by reversing their dosimeters or putting them in their socks, giving them an extra 10 to 30 minutes on-site before they reach their daily dosage limit. In extreme cases, Suzuki said, workers even leave the radiation meters in their dormitories.

According to Suzuki, TEPCO and the subcontractors at the plant never explicitly tell the workers to take these measures. Instead the workers are simply assigned projects that would be impossible to complete on time without manipulating the dosage numbers, and whether through a sense of duty or fear of being fired, the workers never complain.

Furthermore, the daily radiation screenings are "essentially an act," with the detector passed too quickly over each worker, while "the line to the buzzer that is supposed to sound when there's a problem has been cut," Suzuki said.

Meanwhile much of the work -- like road repairs -- is purely cosmetic, and projects directly related to cleaning up the crisis such as decontaminating water -- which Suzuki was involved in -- are rife with cut corners, including the use of plastic piping likely to freeze and crack in the winter.

"We are seeing many problems stemming from the shoddy, rushed work at the power plant," Suzuki says.

Despite the lack of progress and cavalier attitude to safety, Suzuki claims the cold shutdown schedule has essentially choked off any new ideas. The crisis is officially under control and the budget for dealing with it has been cut drastically, and many Hitachi and Toshiba engineers that have presented new solutions have been told there is simply no money to try them.

In sum, Suzuki says what he saw (and photographed with a pinhole camera hidden in his watch) proves the real work to overcome the Fukushima disaster "is just beginning." He lost his own inside look at that work after it was discovered he was a journalist, though officially he was fired because his commute to work was too long.

"The Japanese media have turned away from this issue," he laments, though the story is far from over. (By Robert Irvine, Staff Writer)

A book by Tomohiko Suzuki detailing many of his experiences at the plant and connections between yakuza crime syndicates and the nuclear industry, titled "Yakuza to genpatsu" (the yakuza and nuclear power), was published by Bungei Shunju on Dec. 15.

http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20111216p2a00m0na002000c.html

KLOUG a écrit:

Bonjour
A se demander si on doit en rire ou en pleurer...
Concernant les photos vous en trouverez dans la prochaine synthèse qui est actuellement en relecture.
KLOUG

Bonsoir,
merci pour le boulot de synthèse!
en ce qui concerne les déclarations des autorités japonaises, cela prouve que la seule chose qu'ils connaissent bien, c'est 1984.
à croire que les bureaucrates staliniens du Gossplan se sont réincarnés à Tokyo

la seule chose qu'ils connaissent bien, c'est 1984.
remis au goût du jour avec 1Q84, roman qui se passe en partie dans un univers parallèle

Hi,

Hatoyama: Nationalize Fukushima N-plant
The Yomiuri Shimbun

Only by bringing the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant into government hands can scientists thoroughly discover what caused the nuclear crisis, former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama says in an article published in the Dec. 15 issue of the British science journal Nature.

In the two-page article coauthored by Hatoyama and Tomoyuki Taira, a fellow Democratic Party of Japan member of the House of Representatives, Hatoyama said the Fukushima plant "must be nationalized so that information can be gathered openly."

"A special science council should be created to help scientists from various disciplines to work together on the analyses," he said. "Through such a council, the technologies needed for decommissioning and decontamination...can be developed."

It is extremely rare for a major science journal to carry an article written by a former prime minister as a cover story, according to an official of Nature Japan.

In the article, Hatoyama criticizes Tokyo Electric Power Co., the operator of the crippled plant, for disclosing only limited information to Diet committees. He also hints at the possibility of recriticality at the plant and says there is still much about the crisis that needs clarification, including the state of the molten fuel within the nuclear reactors.

Hatoyama also says that he and Taira obtained data on samples of contaminated water TEPCO obtained from the basement of the plant's No. 1 reactor and asked an outside research institute to reanalyze them.

Results showed that radionuclide chlorine 38, one of the isotopes released during recriticality, "was indeed present," he claims.

TEPCO reported at one point that it found chlorine 38 in the sampled water, but the utility later retracted that statement, saying there was a mistake in the analysis.

(Dec. 16, 2011)

http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T111215005428.htm

http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20111216p2a00m0na002000c.html

témoignage d'un journaliste qui s'est fait embaucher quelques mois à Fukushima incognito,
Il a publié en décembre un livre en japonais sur les liens entre les yakuza et le nucléaire.

L'annonce de "l'arrêt à froid" et de la sortie de crise rencontre pas mal de scepticisme, au Japon et à l'étranger, y compris parmi les membres du parti au pouvoir; certains l'ont même qualifiée de "fiction":
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201112170007
(article en anglais)

Deux articles intéressants du Mainichi (en anglais):

Le premier, fort critique, fait le point sur le prétendu "arrêt à froid" et liste tous les problèmes qui restent à résoudre:
http://mdn.mainichi.jp/perspectives/news/20111217p2a00m0na002000c.html

Le second est le témoignage d'un ingénieur du nucléaire, M. Kitamura, qui travaillait pour la compagnie JAPC; il est devenu quand il a pris sa retraite expert pour le JAIF. Il s'était installé dans la préfecture de Fukushima, où il a acheté une maison, qui se trouve
depuis l'accident dans la zone évacuée.
"How ironic is it that this former nuclear energy advocate has lost both his current life and future life plans to nuclear energy?
"As someone who once promoted nuclear power, and also as someone who has suffered from the disaster, I believe that I should continue sharing my experiences," Kitamura says. "I have a responsibility to do so."
http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20111218p2a00m0na004000c.html

Il partage ses réflexions, et aussi sa culpabilité; quelques formules chocs aussi, telle celle-ci:
"une centrale nucléaire est un appartement sans WC".
Un article peut-être pas très "technique", mais très humain. C'est le plus important, non?

Dans la série "La situation est sous contrôle", contamination de l'océan au strontium radioactif...

Selon l'Asahi Shinbum, ce sont au moins 462 milliards de becquerels de strontium radioactif qui se sont déversés dans l'océan depuis 9 mois:
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201112190001b
(article en anglais)
L'Asahi indique sa méthode de calcul; ils ont pris en compte deux facteurs:
"L'un était le volume d'eau qui a fui de chaque bâtiment du réacteur. L'autre concerne la concentration du strontium radioactif dans l'eau qui s'est accumulée dans chaque bâtiment du réacteur.
En multipliant le volume d'eau filtré par la concentration de strontium radioactif, le journal a calculé le montant total de strontium échappé des deux réacteurs.
Par ailleurs, le volume de strontium, apparemment contenu dans l'eau traitée utilisée à des fins de refroidissement qui a été confirmé pour avoir été déversé dans l'océan, le 4 décembre, a été ajouté à celui des réacteurs n ° 2 et 3.
Dans ce qui est considéré comme le pire des cas au monde de la pollution marine provenant d'une installation nucléaire, quelque 500 milliards de becquerels de strontium ont été déversés par an dans la mer d'Irlande à partir du site de Sellafield installation de retraitement de combustible nucléaire en Cumbria, Grande-Bretagne, dans les années 1970.
Le volume de strontium qui a fui de la centrale de Fukushima est proche de ce montant annuel."

L'article indique que, de son côté, l'industrie de la pêche japonaise a entrepris sa propre évaluation de la contamination radioactive de l'océan.

Du fait de la chaîne alimentaire, le strontium radioactif s'accumule dans les poissons. Il se fixe préférentiellement sur les os et provoque cancer des os et leucémies.
(rem perso: s'il s'accumule dans les squelettes, cela va donner du surimi sympa!)

Bonjour
Et pour reprendre l'information donnée par JSP vous trouverez en français sur http://fukushima.over-blog.fr/, une traduction en français.

Le début de l'article :
Les disparus de Fukushima
Alors que le gouvernement japonais vient de décréter l’arrêt à froid des réacteurs de Fukushima (comme s’il y avait encore des « réacteurs » à Fukushima !), un journaliste japonais indépendant, Tomohiko Suzuki, a donné vendredi une conférence de presse très instructive. Cet homme courageux, journaliste de terrain, s’était fait embaucher à la centrale de Fukushima Daiichi comme ouvrier par l’intermédiaire d’une filiale de Toshiba. Il a pu ainsi enquêter à l’intérieur même du site du 13 juillet au 22 août 2011, assigné à une tâche liée au retraitement de l'eau contaminée. Ses révélations décapantes nous amèneront à nous interroger une nouvelle fois sur la disparition de dizaines, voire de centaines d’ouvriers sur les listes administratives de la centrale nucléaire.

KLOUG

A suivre sur:
http://www.centpapiers.com/les-disparus-de-fukushima/90008

Bonjour,
Sur "l'arrêt à froid" de Fukushima Daichi, l'avis de l'IRSN, seul expert public doté d'une capacité d'analyse objective et critique (depuis le début de l'accident).
Merci M. Thierry CHARLES : "Pour Thierry Charles (Institut de radioprotection et de sûreté nucléaire, IRSN), le terme est «impropre pour un réacteur accidenté. L’arrêt à froid, pour un réacteur nucléaire en bon état, c’est ce qui permet de déclencher le retrait des combustibles usés»
CQFD.
Nota : l'annonce de "l'arrêt à froid" vaut aussi pour les conférences de presse et pour les informations disponibles jusqu'alors sur le site de TEPCO.
http://www.liberation.fr/economie/01012378595-fukushima-l-arret-a-froid-des-reacteurs

Bonjour
Côté cirkus, je crois avoir dit la même hose dans un message précédent.
KLOUG

Bonjour
Et maintenant que "l'arrêt à froid" a été décrété par le gouvernement japonais et TEPCO, voila un autre arrêt à froid, celuid e l'information.
A lire sur : http://fukushima.over-blog.fr/
Fukushima : arrêt à froid de l’information
Et sur http://www.gen4.fr/blog/fukushima/
Le Japon révise à la baisse les limites de contamination des produits alimentaires
Ce qui est plutôt bien pour les japonais !
KLOUG

http://www.lemonde.fr/planete/article/2011/12/22/tsunami-les-japonais-moins-conscients-des-risques_1621976_3244.html

San Francisco - Jusqu'au début du XXe siècle, les Japonais plaçaient parfois des stèles à l'endroit où la mer s'était arrêtée. Gravé dans la pierre, un texte avertissait les générations futures de ne pas s'installer en deçà de cette limite, susceptible d'être submergée en cas de grand tsunami (Le Monde du 7 mai). Au XXIe siècle, les moyens d'informer les populations sont infiniment plus sophistiqués. Et, aussi, formidablement inefficaces. C'est en tout cas la conclusion d'une étude surprenante présentée en décembre à San Francisco (Etats-Unis), au Congrès d'automne de l'American Geophysical Union (AGU). Selon ces travaux, les Japonais tendraient à être moins au fait des risques présentés par les tsunamis depuis la catastrophe du 11 mars.
Pour parvenir à cette paradoxale conclusion, les auteurs ont utilisé une étude d'opinion menée un an avant le séisme de Tohoku. Puis, sur le même échantillon de population, ils ont réitéré les mêmes questions un mois après la catastrophe. "A partir de quelle hauteur de tsunami évacueriez-vous ?" Avant Tohoku, ils étaient 61 % à dire évacuer sous le seuil de trois mètres, contre seulement 38 % après la catastrophe du 11 mars. Pire : un an avant, seules 6,9 % des personnes interrogées étaient suffisamment téméraires pour déclarer n'avoir l'intention d'évacuer qu'au-dessus du seuil de cinq mètres, contre près de quatre fois plus (25,4 %) après les 20 000 morts et disparus du 11 mars... Les "bonnes réponses", précise la géologue Satoko Oki (université de Tokyo) et co-auteure de l'étude avec le psychologue Kazuya Nakayachi (université Doshisha), sont "en dessous de 3 mètres". "Car un tsunami de deux mètres peut emporter une maison", ajoute la chercheuse.
Que diable s'est-il passé ? La réponse est à chercher dans les gros titres de la presse : la répétition incessante, dans les médias, des hauteurs record atteintes par le tsunami – près de 40 mètres par endroit –, a contribué à semer la confusion. Le mécanisme à l'œuvre est celui dit de l'"ancrage heuristique". Ne pouvant se référer dans un passé récent qu'à des hauteurs de vagues phénoménales, le public a tendance à sous-estimer les risques, réels, posés par un tsunami "normal". "Un tsunami gigantesque n'enseigne rien aux populations mais, au contraire, les rend plus vulnérables qu'avant", résume Satoko Oki. En tout cas dans le système médiatique actuel.
Ces résultats ont une conséquence immédiate. Il ne faut plus informer les populations des risques encourus en fonction de la seule hauteur de vague, dit en substance Eddie Bernard (Pacific Marine Environmental Laboratory), spécialiste des systèmes d'alerte aux tsunamis. "En fonction de la topographie des côtes, une vague de trois mètres peut n'avoir aucun impact et une vague d'un mètre avoir un effet destructeur", explique le chercheur. Les Etats-Unis développent ainsi un système fondé sur la modélisation de l'onde, sa propagation dans l'océan et sa rencontre avec les rivages qu'elle est susceptible de heurter. Et ce afin de déterminer les zones les plus vulnérables. Un test grandeur nature d'un tel modèle a été mené le 11 mars sur les côtes de Hawaï, atteintes environ six heures après le séisme de Tohoku. "Les zones qui ont été inondées ont correspondu à 70 % avec les prédictions du modèle", dit M. Bernard. Seul impératif : que les côtes soient suffisamment loin du séisme pour laisser aux ordinateurs le temps de calcul nécessaire...
Stéphane Foucart


commentaire jsp
trop d'information tue l'information
un gros pépin peut faire paraître les alertes suivantes minimes
c'est comme la fable du berger qui crie au loup, au loup...

Hi, sur le site de la NHK

US expert: time to scrap reactors unknown

A US nuclear expert says it is impossible to predict the time needed to decommission the crippled reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant.

Charles Casto told NHK on Wednesday that the true situation inside the reactors remains unknown. Casto represents a team from the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission dispatched to Japan since the nuclear accident in March.

Casto said that after the accident his team advised the Japanese government to continue injecting sea water into the reactors, as well as fresh water, to cool down spent nuclear fuel.

He also said Japanese authorities failed to provide appropriate information to the US government soon after the accident.

Casto said his team felt deep dissatisfaction with Japan for providing only limited information from a small number of engineers.

Last Friday, Japan declared the Fukushima reactors had reached a state of cold shutdown -- the second phase in the program to bring the facility under control.
Wednesday, December 21, 2011 20:50 +0900 (JST)

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/daily/english/20111221_38.html

Qui a dit : " l'expérience est une lanterne qui éclaire derrière soi " ?

Cela semble, helas, se verifier avec la decision des US de relancer la construction de réacteurs AP 1000

Citation :

" l'expérience est une lanterne qui éclaire derrière soi "

Attribué à Confucius...

Hi,

"Gov't starring in own show to bring Fukushima nuclear crisis 'under control'


After determining that the damaged Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant had achieved "cold shutdown conditions," the government announced earlier this month that the nuclear crisis had been brought under control.

"Cold shutdown conditions," however, is a vague phrase, and the government has rewritten the "completed" road map for bringing the crisis under control seven times. It is apparent the government is trying to close the curtain on a performance it has written and acted out to stress to international society that it has brought the crisis under control quickly.

Nine months have now passed since the onset of the disaster. At this time it is worthwhile to look back on crisis management following the outbreak.

At the end of May, an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) delegation speaking to officials of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry noted that the No. 1 plant was in a serious state. The delegation added that while the No. 2 plant had been in a similarly serious state after the March 11 earthquake and tsunami, it had "miraculously" been cooled, offering praise for the handling of the crisis.

In the wake of the tsunami, which also partially knocked out power at the Fukushima No. 2 nuclear plant, workers urgently gathered makeshift cables from the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant in Niigata Prefecture and other locations to cool No. 2 plant's four reactors. A large number of workers were brought in and they worked through the night taking down a baseball field fence on the compound to create a heliport, and the headlights of 20 workers' cars were used to guide helicopters carrying the cables. A total of nine kilometers of cable were laid over two days, and workers just managed to cool the plant. Normally such work would have taken 20 days.

The reason the plant was able to employ such human wave tactics was that the March 11 earthquake occurred on a Friday afternoon, and there happened to be several thousand workers from cooperating companies on the premises.

Naohiro Masuda, head of the Fukushima No. 2 nuclear plant, commented, "I shudder to think how it would have been if it had happened on a Saturday."

While all this was going on, power loss at the No. 1 to 4 reactors of the No. 1 nuclear plant prevented officials from cooling nuclear fuel, and the pool holding 1,535 rods of spent nuclear fuel in the No. 4 reactor building started boiling. If the spent rods had melted down, in a worst-case scenario as many as 30 million people in the Tokyo metropolitan area would have had to be evacuated. However, just before the pool went dry, there was a hydrogen explosion in the reactor building that sent water from a neighboring pool into the one holding the spent fuel, and this scenario was averted

Hydrogen had also been building up in the No. 2 reactor building but an explosion in the neighboring No. 1 reactor building forced open a window in the No. 2 building, releasing the trapped hydrogen and averting another hydrogen explosion. If the pool of the No. 4 reactor building had continued to heat up without water and an explosion had also occurred in the No. 2 reactor, radioactive contamination would be incomparably higher than current levels.

When I interviewed an official from the nuclear plant's operator, Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO), the official told me, "Bringing the situation under control was possible because this happened in Japan; overseas it would have been impossible."

Naturally, I have the utmost respect for the workers who have tirelessly set about dealing with the situation under the threat of radiation exposure. But let us not forget that a series of coincidences also played a part in Japan's response to the accident.

Another point to consider is that when creating the road map to bring the nuclear crisis under control, the government and TEPCO put off facing root problems and instead focused on bringing the disaster "under control."

The road map for settling the crisis consisted of two steps. Step 1, which was to be carried out between April and July, focused on stably cooling the reactors, while step 2, covering the period between July and January 2012, aimed at achieving "cold shutdown conditions." The government looked to speed up work to have step 2 completed by the end of this year.

One of the goals that TEPCO initially announced for step 2 was filling the reactor containment vessels with water. However, the utility abandoned this plan after it emerged that there were holes in the containment vessels. Eventually, officials decided to delay such measures for five years or more. The company also established a goal under step 2 of "dealing with and reducing the amount of radioactive water" on the site, but when the road map was rewritten, it was decided that there would "ongoing treatment" of contaminated water after the completion of other processes.

The latest announcement that the goals of the road map have been achieved is merely the result of officials lowering their own hurdles. It reminds me of the time during World War II when the Imperial Japanese Army headquarters called the Japanese army's retreat a "shift in position."

The definition of "cold shutdown conditions" is a situation in which the temperature at the bottom of the reactor pressure vessels is below 100 degrees Celsius, and the radiation levels within the grounds of the nuclear complex are under 1 millisievert per year, among other factors. However, the heat gauges onsite have error margins of up to 20 degrees Celsius, and the exact temperature inside the reactors remains unknown. Furthermore, the amount of radiation includes only radiation in the atmosphere, and does not take into account radioactive materials released into the sea -- highlighting the vagueness of the standards.

Even Haruki Madarame, chairman of the Cabinet Office's Nuclear Safety Commission, stated, "We have never used the term 'cold shutdown conditions' before. Applying definitions to a nuclear reactor that has had a meltdown is difficult."

The government view disclosed by nuclear disaster minister Goshi Hosono that "the situation is under control onsite, but not offsite," is based only on circumstantial evidence; no one has actually seen inside the reactors.

We can only deduce that the "conclusion" of the crisis, rather than being based on scientific evidence, comes from placing priority on a political decision to create the impression that the crisis has been brought under control quickly. As the stance of a government that is supposed to protect the lives and property of people, such an approach is questionable.

In a news conference on Dec. 16, TEPCO President Toshio Nishizawa called the completion of the road map for bringing the crisis under control a "milestone," but a "milestone" achieved merely by lowering one's own targets is meaningless. The government bears a continued responsibility to monitor TEPCO until its nuclear reactors are decommissioned, and release all necessary information.

Japan has no need for inflated terms like "under control" and "cold shutdown conditions." It is the job of the government and TEPCO to seek "true control" of the disaster. ("As I see it," by Takuji Nakanishi, Tokyo Science and Environment News Department)"

(Mainichi Japan) December 23, 2011

http://mdn.mainichi.jp/perspectives/news/20111223p2a00m0na005000c.html

Hi,

Japan probe finds nuclear disaster response failed
By YURI KAGEYAMA, Associated Press – 3 hours ago

TOKYO (AP) — Japan's response to the nuclear crisis that followed the March 11 tsunami was confused and riddled with problems, including an erroneous assumption an emergency cooling system was working and a delay in disclosing dangerous radiation leaks, a report revealed Monday.
The disturbing picture of harried and bumbling workers and government officials scrambling to respond to the problems at Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant was depicted in the report detailing a government investigation.
The 507-page interim report, compiled by interviewing more than 400 people, including utility workers and government officials, found authorities had grossly underestimated tsunami risks, assuming the highest wave would be 6 meters (20 feet). The tsunami hit at more than double those levels.
The report criticized the use of the term "soteigai," meaning "outside our imagination," which it said implied authorities were shirking responsibility for what had happened. It said by labeling the events as beyond what could have been expected, officials had invited public distrust.
"This accident has taught us an important lesson on how we must be ready for soteigai," it said.
The report, set to be finished by mid-2012, found workers at Tokyo Electric Power Co., the utility that ran Fukushima Dai-ichi, were untrained to handle emergencies like the power shutdown that struck when the tsunami destroyed backup generators — setting off the world's worst nuclear disaster since Chernobyl.
There was no clear manual to follow, and the workers failed to communicate, not only with the government but also among themselves, it said.
Finding alternative ways to bring sorely needed water to the reactors was delayed for hours because of the mishandling of an emergency cooling system, the report said. Workers assumed the system was working, despite several warning signs it had failed and was sending the nuclear core into meltdown.
The report acknowledged that even if the system had kicked in properly, the tsunami damage may have been so great that meltdowns would have happened anyway.
But a better response might have reduced the core damage, radiation leaks and the hydrogen explosions that followed at two reactors and sent plumes of radiation into the air, according to the report.
Sadder still was how the government dallied in relaying information to the public, such as using evasive language to avoid admitting serious meltdowns at the reactors, the report said.
The government also delayed disclosure of radiation data in the area, unnecessarily exposing entire towns to radiation when they could have evacuated, the report found.
The government recommended changes so utilities will respond properly to serious accidents.
It recommended separating the nuclear regulators from the unit that promotes atomic energy, echoing frequent criticism since the disaster.
Japan's nuclear regulators were in the same ministry that promotes the industry, but they are being moved to the environment ministry next year to ensure more independence.
The report did not advocate a move away from nuclear power but recommended adding more knowledgeable experts, including those who would have been able to assess tsunami risks, and laying out an adequate response plan to what it called "a severe accident."
The report acknowledged people were still living in fear of radiation spewed into the air and water, as well as radiation in the food they eat. Thousands have been forced to evacuate and have suffered monetary damage from radiation contamination, it said.
"The nuclear disaster is far from over," the report said.
The earthquake and tsunami left 20,000 people dead or missing.
Follow Yuri Kageyama on Twitter at http://twitter.com/yurikageyama
Copyright © 2011 The Associated Press.

http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5jJMKHqE_ffiXqRQKfiRIArgaojBw?docId=38cf0057befd494a98dac1dccbcf47c7

http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20111226p2g00m0dm113000c.html
rapport publié le 26 décembre
http://www.lepoint.fr/monde/fukushima-un-rapport-souligne-les-defaillances-de-tepco-26-12-2011-1412618_24.php

Bonjour
Mis dans la rubrique d'actualité du site :

La société japonaise Tepco pourrait être nationalisée
27/12/2011
Source : LEMONDE.FR avec AFP, Reuters | 27.12.11 | 09h31

Tepco va réduire ses effectifs de 14 % d'ici à mars 2014.REUTERS/STRINGER/JAPAN

Selon le quotidien financier Nikkei, le ministre du commerce et de l'industrie japonais, Yukio Edano, exhortera mardi 27 décembre Tokyo Electric Power (Tepco), l'opérateur de la centrale de Fukushima, à accepter une injection de fonds publics et une nationalisation de facto.
La première société japonaise de services aux collectivités est plombée par des charges financières énormes consécutives au séisme et au tsunami du 11 mars qui ont provoqué une catastrophe nucléaire à sa centrale de Fukushima. Selon Reuters, l'Etat pourrait injecter autour de 13 milliards d'euros dans Tepco dès l'été 2012, décision représentant une nationalisation de fait. Yukio Edano doit rencontrer un haut responsable de Tepco mardi soir, à la suite d'un conseil des ministres consacré à Tepco et à la réforme de l'électricité
L'opérateur de la centrale nucléaire accidentée Fukushima Daiichi a par ailleurs requis auprès d'un organisme public une aide supplémentaire d'environ 700 milliards de yens (près de 7 milliards d'euros), pour payer une partie de l'indemnisation des victimes du désastre atomique.
La compagnie avait déjà réclamé en octobre une avance de l'ordre de 1 011 milliards de yens (10 milliards d'euros) qu'elle veut désormais porter à 1 703 milliards de yens (16,7 milliards d'euros).

Voir la suite de l'article sur le site
http://www.rpcirkus.org/actualites/actualites-nucleaire/936-la-societe-japonaise-tepco-pourrait-etre-nationalisee

KLOUG

Pêché sur ENENEWS aujourd'hui mais l'enregistrement de cette conférence de presse ou le Ministre Japonnais Hosono (en charge de la catastrophe de Fukushima) semble dater du 19 décembre. S'agissant d'une voix officielle, je suis surpris de ne pas avoir vu reprise cette info : c'est bien la première fois qu'est clairement évoquée comme très probable l'excursion du corium hors des enceintes. Interpellé très directement sur l'incohérence qui consistait à affirmer simultanément "qu'on était en arrêt à froid [cold shutdown]" et "qu'on ignorait où se trouvait le combustible" par le journaliste japonnais freelance Teddy Jimbo, le Ministre déclare que des trois possibilités pour la localisation actuelle du combustible fondu (dans le réacteur, dans l'enceinte de confinement ou à l'extérieur de cette dernière), la plus probable est sans doute la troisième.

http://enenews.com/top-japan-official-very-strong-possibility-nuclear-fuel-containment-vessel-reactors-video